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Life-Cycle Consumption Patterns at Older Ages in the 
United States and the United Kingdom: Can Medical 
Expenditures Explain the Difference?†
By James Banks, Richard Blundell, Peter Levell, and James P. Smith*
This paper documents significantly steeper declines in  nondurable 
expenditures at older ages in the United Kingdom compared to 
the United States, in spite of income paths being similar. Several 
 possible causes are explored, including different employment paths, 
 housing  ownership and expenses, levels and paths of health status, 
number of household  members, and out-of-pocket  medical expendi-
tures. Among all the  potential explanations considered, those relat-
ing to  health care — differences in  levels and age paths in medical 
expenses and medical expenditure risk— can fully account for the 
steeper declines in  nondurable consumption in the United Kingdom 
compared to the United States. (JEL D14, D15, I11, J14)
As populations in advanced countries continue to age, a key concern for  policymakers is whether individuals have saved enough to fund their 
 consumption needs over increasingly long retirement periods. Understanding tra-
jectories of consumption and wealth as individuals age is crucial to resolving this 
question. Research on life-cycle consumption patterns has typically concentrated 
on working ages with an emphasis on expected paths in labor income, economic 
wage shocks, and retirement; see, for example, the Review of Economic Dynamics 
special issue on micro facts (Violante 2010). However, this leaves out an important 
and growing span of life during the post-retirement years where other factors such 
as health,  mortality, health expenses, and shifts in housing expenditures and recre-
ation may play an increasingly central role. Moreover, these are areas where there 
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are large cross-country institutional differences—for example in housing markets 
and in whether medical care is privately or government financed—that may have 
important implications for patterns of nondurable consumption at older ages.
In the United Kingdom, average nondurable expenditure between the ages of 45 
and 79 falls by 2.2 percent each year. This compares to 1.4 percent for the United 
States. To  illustrate, the first panel of Figure 1 plots nondurable expenditures in the 
United Kingdom and United States by age averaged across birth cohorts. It’s clear 
that spending falls only gradually after age 50 in the United States while it falls 
much more rapidly in the United Kingdom.
What can explain a difference of this magnitude? An obvious starting point 
is to examine age paths of income to assess the extent to which consumption 
expenditures are tracking age paths in household income. But the second panel 
in Figure 1, which plots cohort averaged paths of household income at older ages 
in the two countries, demonstrates that, if anything, incomes decline at a slightly 
faster rate in the United States than the United Kingdom.1 This therefore seems 
unlikely to be the major  reason for a flatter spending profile in the United States. 
In this paper, we  investigate other possible  reasons that may explain the dramati-
cally  different  patterns of  nondurable  consumption of older ages in the two coun-
tries by  investigating  differences in inter-temporal consumption for households 
around and beyond retirement age.
The set of factors that we explore in this paper include: differential cohort effects 
in the two countries that may distort average life-cycle age profiles, differences in 
timing of retirement in the presence of separabilities with employment, differential 
paths of housing expenditures possibly driven by institutional differences in housing 
markets between countries, level and path differences in health status and mortality, 
1 In both countries, income is measured as the sum of salary, investment, interest, rental, and transfer income 
and other income net of tax payments. In neither country does income include capital gains on property or other 
investments. UK prices are converted to US dollars with PPP indexes. 
Figure 1. Nondurable Spending and Incomes in the United States and United Kingdom by Age, 1984–2010
Notes: Values are in US 2010 dollars. Figures equivalized using the modified OECD scale. The  definition of spend-
ing includes medical expenditures.
Source: Authors’ calculations using BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey 1984–2010 and ONS Living Costs and 
Food Survey  1984 –2010
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and finally, the levels, prices, and volatility of medical spending, as in the United 
States deteriorating health with age leads to higher spending there, while this is 
not true in the United Kingdom because of the National Health Service (NHS). We 
include out-of-pocket spending on nonmedical nondurables in the two countries in 
Figure 1. It is immediately clear that this helps account for a significant fraction, 
though not all, of the difference between the two countries.2 As we detail below, 
once medical expenditures are removed, the difference in the decline in spending 
between the two countries shrinks by around three-quarters. Different papers have 
made different decisions about whether medical expenditures should be included 
in the definition of nondurable consumption. For instance, Heathcote, Perri, and 
Violante (2010) and Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) include medical spending in 
their measures of expenditure, while, for instance, Attanasio and Weber (1995); 
Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997); Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008); and 
Attanasio, Hurst, and Pistaferri (2012) do not (often on the grounds that spending 
on health care is more akin to investment than consumption spending). Our results 
highlight the importance of giving careful consideration to such choices.
Medical spending is not the only difference between the two countries  however. 
We therefore move on to quantify cross-country differences in three potential 
 factors—employment, housing status, and health—and look for any immedi-
ate  differences that might explain the differential consumption paths observed in 
Figure 1. While there are some differences in the way these variables evolve in 
the two countries, these differences do not seem large enough to account for the 
cross-country difference in spending patterns.
We examine this hypothesis more formally in a regression context, finding that 
controlling for these factors only marginally reduces the cross-country difference in 
the decline in nondurable consumption spending with age when medical expenditure 
is included. We then turn to model nonmedical consumption conditional on health 
status and real medical expenditures. This approach allows preferences for nonmed-
ical consumption to change in a non-separable way with health and the consumption 
of medical goods. It also captures any substitution effects driven by the change in the 
relative price of medical consumption. We also consider the role medical expense 
uncertainty may play in explaining consumption profiles in the United States, partly 
by exploiting differences in the institutional environments in the two countries. We 
find suggestive evidence that precautionary savings against medical expense risk 
play an important role in US consumption decisions. Controlling for both medical 
uncertainty and relative prices fully explains the cross-country difference in spend-
ing declines. Our regression estimates imply that medical uncertainty increases con-
sumption growth at older ages in the United States by around 0.90  percentage points 
2 Changes in medical spending at older ages could in principle be driven by changes in medical consumption 
in the two countries or differences in the prices paid for medical care. Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) for  medical 
care from the OECD suggest that the level of prices (paid by both government and consumers) is consistently higher 
in the United States than the United Kingdom (see http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PPP2014). In 
2005, for  example, UK prices were estimated to be 78 percent of costs in the United States. In online Appendix B, 
we also consider the rate of change of medical prices in the United States versus the United Kingdom for the period 
1988–2010. Price movements in the two countries track each other quite closely for much of this period, but US 
medical price inflation is higher in the latter years of the sample. If medical care is a normal good, this would tend 
to reduce US consumption of medical care relative to the United Kingdom. 
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per year on average for the ages we consider. Precautionary motives against medical 
expense risk in the United Kingdom are, by contrast, negligible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe in 
more detail the essential features of the data we assemble to look at these issues and 
document cohort specific paths of nondurable spending and household income for 
both countries. We then move on to look at various potential explanations for the 
cross-country differences in turn. Section II provides a description for cohort spe-
cific age paths in employment in the two countries and discusses their implications 
for consumption profiles, Section III provides a parallel treatment for housing by 
describing age paths of housing ownership, and Section IV focuses on levels and 
paths of health status and differential levels and age patterns of medical expendi-
tures. Section V presents results obtained from an inter-temporal model of growth 
rates in total nondurable expenditures for each country to identify factors that may 
account for different shaped consumption paths at older ages. The final section high-
lights our main conclusions.
I. The Life-Cycle Pattern of Consumption and Income
We use two repeated cross-sectional surveys widely viewed as containing the 
highest quality measurement of household expenditure and its components in each 
country— the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) in the United States and the 
Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS) in the United Kingdom. While these surveys 
do not cover the same  individuals for long periods of time, we organize the data to 
create a pseudo-panel and track cohort consumption behavior by age (in the manner 
of Browning, Deaton, and Irish 1985). To do this, we group individual observations 
by five-year birth cohorts and take averages within each year. Cohorts are deter-
mined by the age of household head. Following this approach allows us to merge in 
information from other surveys at the cohort-year level where necessary.
The LCFS is an annual cross-sectional survey that has been running in one form or 
another since 1961. The LCFS, formerly known as the Family Expenditure Survey, 
is conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the United Kingdom’s 
national statistical agency, and has been the basis of a number of studies of intra- 
and inter-temporal spending patterns. Currently it interviews around 6,000 house-
holds throughout the United Kingdom and continuously throughout the year. The 
survey begins with an interview with questions about demographic characteristics, 
income, large purchases over the last year, and regular expenditures (such as maga-
zine subscriptions, internet subscription costs, and so on). Each household member 
over 16 then records all spending in a diary over the next 2 weeks.
For the United States, we make use of the Consumer Expenditure survey (CEX). 
This survey has been carried out by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on a con-
tinuous basis since 1980. For some quarters prior to 1984, the survey only covered 
households living in urban areas. The CEX includes two separate surveys, a diary 
survey which works much like the LCFS, and an interview survey, where households 
are asked to recall their spending on a range of spending categories over the previous 
three months. The interview survey is also a short panel, as the same households are 
interviewed on up to five occasions. The first of these interviews collects some basic 
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data on family characteristics. Each subsequent interview updates this information 
and asks questions concerning household spending over the previous three months. 
Information on incomes and labor force participation are, however, only collected 
in the second and fifth interviews (except for new household members and members 
who have newly started work), meaning that income and spending data for the third 
and fourth interviews need not cover the same time periods. In this paper, we only 
make use of the interview survey.3 Around 5,000–8,000 households are interviewed 
in each quarter.
In both UK and US surveys, spending data are provided for hundreds of highly 
disaggregated individual product codes. We allocate these goods into eight broader 
categories defined to be consistent across the two countries: food in, food out, other 
nondurables, medical, housing related, recreation and transport, and durables. Some 
examples of what are included in these categories are given in Table 1. We do not 
include rental payments or mortgage interest in any of these definitions as we do not 
observe the “shadow price” of owned housing in the LCFS, nor can we estimate it 
easily (the CEX does include a self-reported imputed rental cost for owned proper-
ties). We define total nondurable expenditures to include all rows in Table 1 with the 
exception of the final row measuring durable spending.
Household income data are derived from the same surveys and cohort age pro-
files obtained in the same manner. Household income is defined comprehensively 
to include all sources of income for the head of household, the spouse/partner, and 
all other household members net of taxes. US expenditures and incomes are deflated 
to 2010 terms using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). UK variables are deflated to 
2010 terms using the Retail Prices Index and then converted into dollars using PPP 
exchange rates for that year taken from the OECD. Both surveys contain measures 
of standard definitions of labor force participation. From 1994 onward, the CEX also 
contains detailed questions on the nature of households’ health insurance  policies 
and Medicare coverage. In both datasets, we restrict our attention to  households 
where the head is aged 45–79. This is because ages in the LCFS are top-coded at 
age 80 from 2002 onward.4
To control for measurement error and impacts of extreme values on life-cycle 
paths, we trim households in the top or bottom 1 percent of distribution of income 
and expenditure. In the CEX, we take data from 1984 (to consistently include a 
nationwide sample) until 2010. For the LCFS, we take data from 1978 until 2010. 
We stop in 2010 in both countries as we do not have mortality data for either country 
after this date.
Figure 1 shows spending at different ages averaged across different birth cohorts 
and different years. This means that differences between the two countries shown 
there may partly be driven by differences in cohort and time effects. To understand 
whether the patterns in Figure 1 are driven by cohort effects, Figures 2 and 3 show 
3 While the methodology employed in the CEX diary survey is arguably more similar to that used in the LCFS 
than the interview survey, the diary survey has lower sample sizes, tends to exhibit greater variability in responses, 
and tends to underreport spending relative to the interview survey (Bee, Meyer, and Sullivan 2015). For these 
 reasons, we make use of the interview survey instead. 
4 We also plotted spending, income, and demographics up to age 85 in the two countries using data up to 2001 
only. The patterns in the two countries are very similar. Results are available on request. 
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how spending and incomes decline within cohorts in the two countries. Before 
 plotting these, we remove average differences across cohorts by regressing spend-
ing and income on cohort dummies and taking the residuals. It is clear that cohort 
effects by themselves cannot account for the main puzzle with which we motivated 
this paper. Although the spending decline observed in the United Kingdom is some-
what smaller when one looks within individual cohorts rather than averaging across 
them, the age pattern of nondurable consumption at older ages in the United States 
remains relatively flat. Within-cohort declines in incomes are also similar across the 
countries.5
5 In the CEX, there were two changes to the way incomes were measured that matter for Figure 3. One occurred 
in 2001 and the other in 2004. The first introduced a bracketing question for those who did not report their incomes 
the first time round. The second introduced imputation for nonresponders. The income definition we employ makes 
Figure 2. Nondurable Spending by Cohort and Age
Notes: Each line represents average log nondurable expenditures at each age for five-year birth cohorts over the 
 periods they are observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1984–2010. Average differences across cohorts 
are removed by regressing spending on cohort dummies and taking the residuals. Values are in US 2010 dollars. UK 
prices are converted to dollars with PPP indexes. Figures equivalized using the modified OECD scale.
Source: Data from LCFS in the United Kingdom and CEX for the United States
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Table 1—Spending Categories
Food in Food at home
Food out Food in restaurants, school dinners, catering
Other nondurables Alcohol, tobacco, clothes, books, child care, pet goods, and services
Medical Health insurance premia, fees for services from health professionals, 
drugs,  medical equipment, care in nursing homes, care of invalids
Housing related Electricity, gas, and water bills, domestic services, repairs, 
building insurance
Recreation Sporting goods, musical instruments, CDs, entertainment, holidays
Transport Motoring costs, petrol, fares for public transport, air fares
Durables Vehicles, appliances, entertainment equipment
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II. Differences in Employment and Retirement
One dimension of labor force behavior at older ages that has been studied in the 
context of consumption age profiles involves the impact of retirement on levels and 
time paths of consumption. Consumption levels and paths may not be independent 
of the retirement decision if preferences over employment and consumption are not 
separable, or individuals do not fully anticipate income reductions coincident with 
labor market retirement (Banks, Blundell, and Tanner 1998). The importance of this 
in explaining consumption trajectories at older ages is substantial. In the United 
States, it has been estimated that work-related expenditures account for the entire 
decline in nondurable spending from middle age to age 75 (Aguiar and Hurst 2013). 
In addition to any direct costs associated with work, movements out of employment 
may also be associated with having more time to spend shopping for discounts or 
for home production of some goods (Aguiar and Hurst 2007). This could partially 
explain cross-country differences if there are differences in the links between labor 
supply and consumption expenditures in the two countries, or if declines in employ-
ment were more rapid in one country than another (or both).
These declines in male employment by age are somewhat more rapid in the 
United Kingdom compared to the United States. However, in the absence of 
 non-separabilities in employment and consumption, differences in paths of employ-
ment at older ages in the two countries do not seem large enough to be the major 
explanation for the  substantial differences in consumption profiles. We will examine 
the role of  non-separabilities between labor supply and consumption in explaining 
use of non-bracketed responses only from 2001 and non-imputed values for income from 2006 onward. In 2004 and 
2005, it is not possible to remove non-imputed income values. 
Figure 3. log Household Income by Cohort and Age
Notes: Each line represents average log incomes at each age for five-year birth cohorts over the periods they are 
observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1984 –2010. Average differences across cohorts are removed by 
regressing incomes on cohort dummies and taking the residuals. Values are in US 2010 dollars. Figures equivalized 
using the modified OECD scale.
Source: Data from LCFS in the United Kingdom and CEX for the United States
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the cross-country difference in consumption profiles in more detail in Section V 
below.6
III. Housing Ownership and Downsizing
Housing-related decisions and expenditures represent another spending category 
in which there are important institutional differences between the countries that may 
affect levels and age paths of expenditures at older ages. Banks et al. (2010, 2012) 
provides evidence that there exists far less geographical mobility in Britain com-
pared to the United States and more downsizing in the United States compared to 
the United Kingdom as a meaningful fraction of older Americans move to smaller 
homes (i.e., fewer rooms) with little evidence of such downsizing in Britain. While 
this lower rate of British mobility was characteristic of both owners and renters, the 
differential was particularly high among renters.
For British households over age 50, the probability of being a homeowner is 
about 13 percentage points lower than for an American household, a deficit mostly 
offset by a higher probability of renting in highly subsidized “social” housing. The 
major secular changes in housing tenure at older ages have decidedly taken place in 
the United Kingdom and not the United States. The fraction of older British people 
owning their own home increased by almost 30  percentage points (from less than 
half to over 80 percent) from the 1908–1912 cohort to the  1943–1947 cohort. In 
contrast, over the same set of birth cohorts and age groups, the fraction of older 
American households who were homeowners has remained  relatively stable at 
around 80 percent.
The primary reason for this secular change in home ownership rates for older 
British households is due to changes in the proportion of individuals in social hous-
ing. In the United Kingdom, there is a system of subsidized housing, often referred 
to as local authority, social, or council housing. Those who are allocated a property 
pay a below-market rent, and the landlord will be either the local authority or a hous-
ing association. Individuals entitled to such a rental property are placed on a waiting 
list until suitable accommodation becomes available. While entitlement to live in 
social housing is subject to a strict means test, once allocated a property, tenants can 
usually stay for life irrespective of any changes in circumstance. Social renters have 
a severely reduced incentive and ability to move or to downsize their property, for 
several reasons. Even if a tenant’s current circumstances mean that they are still enti-
tled to social housing, moving can be very difficult because of shortages of social 
housing. Existing tenants are treated the same as new applicants, so if they are not 
in a priority group, they may not be allocated a different property. For those whose 
circumstances have changed in such a way that they would no longer be entitled to 
social housing if they were to reapply, there is a large incentive not to move as they 
may not be allocated a different property at all and may have to move into the private 
sector and pay full market rent.
6 Age paths for women (not shown) also display the same pattern of rapid declining employment rates with age 
as women exit the labor force in both countries. 
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There has been a sharp across-cohort decline in social rental housing in the 
United Kingdom that parallels the increase in home ownership across cohorts 
(which for space  considerations we do not plot). There was an almost 30  per-
centage point decline in the fraction of British households in social rental hous-
ing, which is pretty much the same percentage point increase observed in home 
ownership. Over the same set of birth cohorts, ages, and years, there was little 
change in the fraction of households in private rental housing. These changes 
reflect the introduction of a “ Right-to-buy” in 1980, which required local authori-
ties to sell council-owned housing at a discount to eligible tenants (the policy was 
later extended to other forms of social housing).
The differences in levels and trends in ownership patterns between the two 
 countries may partially contribute to an understanding of the differences in 
 age-consumption profiles. We examine the impact conditioning on these differ-
ences might play in Section V below.
IV. Health and the Divergence of Medical Expenditures
Our health measures are based on self-reported health status, age-specific 
 mortality rates, and out-of-pocket medical expenditures by cohort, age, and gender. 
Neither the CEX nor LCFS include information on health or mortality, so we draw 
these from other sources.
A. Health Status
For the United Kingdom, health status data come from two cross-sectional sur-
veys—the Health Survey for England (HSE) and the General Household survey 
(GHS). These  surveys contain information on household’s self-reported health, 
which we average by age, sex, and cohort. Two surveys are used as we do not have 
Figure 4
Note: Each line represents average employment rates for men at each age for five-year birth cohorts over the periods 
they are observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1984–2010.
Source: Data from LCFS in the United Kingdom and CEX for the United States
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GHS data after 2006 and HSE data before 1991. In addition, there are two breaks 
in the GHS (in 1997 and 1999), due to redesigns of the survey, which interrupt 
the series. We make use of GHS data up to 1997 and HSE data from 1997 onward. 
In the GHS, respondents are asked about their general health status over the last 
12 months, which they answer on a three-point scale: answers can be good, fairly 
good, or poor. In the HSE, households are asked to report their general health on 
a five-point scale—very good, good, fair, bad, or very bad. For consistency, we 
group these into three categories (by putting the final three responses into a sin-
gle worst health group). We then average health status by age, year, and sex and 
use this information to impute health of household heads in the LCFS. The switch 
from the GHS to the HSE surveys introduces a downward shift in the level of 
self-reported health statuses beginning in 1997. In what follows, we remove this 
discontinuity by regressing health status in both surveys on a GHS dummy and 
taking the residuals. To our self-reported health data, we add data on mortality 
rates by age, sex, and cohort/year from the ONS mortality tables.
For the United States, we use the National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS). 
NHIS is an ongoing nationwide survey of about 40,000 households. Since 1982, 
NHIS used a five-point scale to measure respondents’ general health status: “Would 
you say your health in general was excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” We 
create three categories for consistency with our UK measure. These three groups are 
excellent or very good, good, and fair or poor. We use these to impute health statuses 
to household heads and spouses in the CEX in the same way we do for the LCFS. 
We also calculate the proportion of responses that are self-reported in each cell to 
use as a control. Mortality data for the United States are obtained from the Berkeley 
life tables, which also give death rates by age, gender, and year (http://www.demog.
berkeley.edu/~bmd/states.html).
Figure 5 plots proportions of those in worst health in both countries  showing 
 several distinct patterns in health status in both countries. First,  levels of worse 
health are always higher in the United Kingdom than in the United States. 
However, these different levels of subjective health status in the United Kingdom 
 compared to the United States have been shown to be due to different subjective 
health thresholds between the two countries. In the age groups we are  considering, 
the British are typically healthier than the Americans with  prevalence of almost 
all diseases higher in the United States compared to the United Kingdom (Banks 
et al. 2006). At the same objective health levels, the British report themselves in 
worse health on subjective scales. The second pattern to note in Figure 5 is that 
the fraction of a cohort in poor health rises with age in both countries. The third 
pattern concerns cohort effects in these paths of health at older ages. While there 
is little evidence of cohort differences in the United Kingdom, cohort differences 
are however apparent in the United States. Finally, we note that subjective health 
declines faster with age in the United Kingdom than the United States. We attempt 
to account for the potential role of health status in explaining the different expen-
diture patterns we observe in Figure 1 in our regression analysis below.
The impact of declining health on consumption decisions in a  life-cycle model 
will depend on how it affects the marginal utility of consumption. If poor health 
reduces the marginal utility of consumption, then we will observe  that 
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 consumption  declines  more steeply with age as health deteriorates. Various 
papers have  investigated the dependence of the marginal utility of consumption on 
health  without achieving  consensus on either its sign or magnitude (Finkelstein, 
Luttmer, and Notowidigdo 2009 for a survey of the available literature). Lillard 
and Weiss (1997) find that there is substantial positive effect on marginal util-
ity using panel data on consumption (as inferred from income flows and asset 
changes) and health shocks. By contrast, employing a novel approach that com-
bines data on permanent income, utility proxies, and health data, Finkelstein, 
Luttmer, and Notowidigdo (2013) finds a substantial negative effect. Other studies 
have  essentially found no effect. De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) estimates a 
model allowing preferences over consumption to be health dependent. They find 
that the parameter governing the effect of health on the marginal utility is negative 
but statistically insignificant.
B. Life Expectancies and Age Paths of Mortality
We present information on life expectancies at different ages in two countries in 
Table 2. Panel A shows life expectancies in 1984. Panel B shows equivalent figures 
for 2010. For both men and women, life expectancies at each given age tended to 
be greater in the United States than the United Kingdom in the early part of our 
sample (these differences had largely disappeared by the end of our sample period 
in 2010).
In the standard life-cycle model, higher age-specific mortality risk acts like 
a decline in the interest rate encouraging current consumption and producing a 
steeper decline in consumption with age. Mortality risk rises steeply with age in 
both countries with mortality risk about 10 times larger at age 70 compared to 
Figure 5. Proportion of Responders in Worst Health by Cohort and Age
Note: Each line represents proportion of household heads reporting being in the worst health condition at each age 
for five-year birth cohorts over the periods they are observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1984 –2010.
Source: Data for the United Kingdom is from the HSE and GHS surveys spliced together (adjusted to remove dis-
continuity between the surveys). Data for the United States is from the NHIS.
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age 45. There is evidence of cohort improvements in mortality that are larger in 
the United Kingdom compared to the United States. However, the shape of the age 
mortality risk function appears to be similar in the two countries suggesting once 
again that differential mortality risk by age, see Hurd (1989), does not appear to 
be the likely source of the significantly differently age shapes in consumption in 
the two countries documented in Figure 1. In any case, we account for mortality’s 
potential role in explaining spending differences within a regression framework 
in what follows.
C. Medical Expenses
On the health side of potential explanations, we have so far explored age 
patterns at older ages in general health status and mortality. While both health 
dimensions may play a role in shaping consumption profiles at older ages, their 
ability either alone or together to account for the much flatter nondurable con-
sumption with age in the United States compared to the United Kingdom seems 
Table 2—Life Expectancies at Different Ages, 1984 and 2010
Age United Kingdom United States
Panel A. 1984
Males
 60 16.60 17.79
 65 13.24 14.48
 70 10.31 11.52
 75 7.86 8.99
 80 5.91 6.82
Females
 60 21.06 22.48
 65 17.20 18.63
 70 13.63 15.03
 75 10.44 11.77
 80 7.70 8.85
Panel B. 2010
Males
 60 22.03 21.64
 65 18.03 17.89
 70 14.33 14.39
 75 11.00 11.19
 80 8.10 8.37
Females
 60 24.92 24.63
 65 20.66 20.50
 70 16.61 16.63
 75 12.88 13.05
 80 9.55 9.83
Source: For the United Kingdom, these are taken from the ONS life tables. United States 
figures are obtained from the Human Mortality Database (http://www.demog.berkeley.edu 
/~bmd/states.html).
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limited. The final health  dimension we examine—health expenditures—appears 
to us to offer far more potential since there are large differences between the two 
countries. While consumption of  medical services may increase in both countries 
as individuals age, differences in how the costs of these are financed will show up 
as differences in both the level of measured out-of-pocket expenditures and their 
dispersion.
How health costs are financed at older ages in the two countries are quite 
 different. To a large extent, UK medical costs at all ages are paid by the state with 
very little absorbed by the individual.7 State provision not only includes medica-
tions and doctor visits, but hospitalizations as well. Charges are, however, typi-
cally levied for  prescription drugs and dental care. There are also often charges for 
long-term care costs as we discuss below.
The situation is very different in the United States where government  assistance 
for health care is incomplete and a large proportion of the costs of medical 
 insurance are met by employers or directly by households rather than by govern-
ment. Government assistance for health care in the United States is mostly  provided 
through the Medicare and Medicaid programs.8 Figure 6 shows enrollment under 
the two schemes over the ages we consider. Medicare provides some insurance 
for the vast majority (over 90 percent) of households with heads over 65 but only 
a limited proportion of younger households. The share of households that report 
receiving some support from Medicaid increases somewhat from around 7 percent 
to around 10 percent as individuals’ age from 45 to 75.
While previous studies have found that Medicare eligibility reduces both the 
mean and variance of out-of-pocket (OOP) medical expenditures (Barcellos and 
Jacobson 2015), it does not eliminate the need for them entirely. Coverage is 
neither free nor comprehensive with various direct costs for households. While 
 hospital  insurance (Medicare Part A) is typically provided free of charge, insur-
ance for doctor’s  services and prescription drugs (covered under Parts B and D) 
involve income-contingent premia. Individuals covered under Medicare Part C (or 
Medicare advantage) contract with a private company to receive their part A and 
B coverage and may pay a higher premium for additional coverage. In addition, 
Medicare does not cover the costs of all treatments and even when treatments are 
covered, patients must pay deductibles, co-payments, and coinsurance from their 
own resources. A further institutional difference between the two countries is that, 
in the United States, a large fraction of individuals have their private insurance costs 
7 In 2016, for example, health care expenditures totaled $4,192 per capita in the United Kingdom, of which 
roughly 80  percent was paid for by the government. This compared to $9,892 in the United States, of which roughly 
50 percent was public  expenditure (see https://data.oecd.org/healthres/health-spending.htm).
8 Medicare is a government insurance program for the elderly. Most individuals become eligible for the scheme 
when they turn 65. Eligibility is automatic for those who have worked and accumulated Social Security credits for 
at least ten years prior to reaching this age, but those who do not meet this requirement may also qualify on the basis 
of their spouse’s contribution history. There are, however, some groups who can qualify at younger ages. For exam-
ple, those who have received Social Security disability benefits for at least 24 months automatically receive partial 
coverage. Around 12 percent of the population is already enrolled by the time they reach age 65 (Card, Dobkin, and 
Maestas 2009). Medicaid is a general scheme that provides reduced cost or free health services for low-income and 
low-wealth households, including those attempting to meet the costs of their long-term care. Exactly who or what 
is eligible varies from state to state with the federal government specifying minimum standards of coverage. Over 
half of  long-term care costs are paid through Medicaid (O’Shaughnessy 2014). 
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covered by third parties (usually employers). This proportion tends to decline with 
age,  however, as individuals retire and leave the labor market. Prior to age 65, a 
majority of American households have their insurance at least partially paid for by 
some third party, but this falls to around 40 percent at age 70 as panel A in Figure 7 
shows. Similarly, the proportion of households who have insurance but pay nothing 
(shown in Figure 7, panel B) falls from 20 percent at age 45 to less than 3 percent 
at 75. For workers, the share of health costs paid by employers is substantial, at 
around 75–80 percent of the total.9
The institutions in the two countries naturally have consequences for paths of 
medical expenditures as individual’s age. We plot the budget shares for medical 
spending for the two countries in the two panels of Figure 8. Not only are medical 
costs in the United Kingdom lower as a share of the budget (always under 5 per-
cent), but there are only modest increases in this share with age. In contrast, the US 
graph indicates much higher and sharply rising medical costs shares at older ages in 
the United States that are not due solely to cohort effects. To illustrate, medical costs 
shares in the United States are approximately 8 percent at age 45 and rise steadily 
until they are around 20 percent of the total budget by age 70. The decomposition of 
these medical expenditures for a single cohort is shown in Figure 9.10 In the United 
Kingdom, the majority of medical spending goes towards non-insurance costs. In 
the United States, insurance premia are far more important.
Medicare spending begins to rise when the head reaches age 65, but the trajectory 
of overall spending is smooth.
9 See Exhibit 4.1 in http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/MEPSICChartbook.pdf.
10 Results from other cohorts are very similar. 
Figure 6. Proportions Covered by Government Programs, United States
Note: Each line represents proportions of households with at least one member covered by Medicare or Medicaid 
at each age for five-year birth cohorts over the periods they are observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 
1994 – 2010.
Source: Data from CEX
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Information on the distribution of medical expenses, and the riskiness of such 
expenses, is harder to come by, particularly in the United Kingdom. Table 3 com-
pares the  distribution of annual OOP medical expenses by major categories in 
the United Kingdom and United States, for all households aged 60 or over.11 The 
11 The best source of information to break down such expenses is the longitudinal aging surveys, and we use 
the US Health and Retirement Survey for this analysis. Since the level of out OOP medical expenses is so low, the 
English equivalent of the HRS does not collect information on such spending, so we use the cross-sectional LCFS 
data as in the rest of our analysis above. 
Figure 7. Insurance Paid for by Others, United States
Notes: Each line represents average coverage rates at each age for five-year birth cohorts over the periods they are 
observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1994–2010. Panel A shows the proportion of households who 
report insurance policies wholly or partially financed by third parties. Panel B shows the proportion of households 
who pay no insurance costs but report being covered by insurance paid for by third parties.
Source: Data from CEX
Figure 8. Share of Cohort Spending on Medical Care
Note: Each line represents average budget shares out of nondurable expenditures at each age for five-year birth 
cohorts over the periods they are observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1984–2010.
Source: Data from LCFS in the United Kingdom and CEX for the United States
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Figure 9. Composition of OOP Medical Spending (1928 –1932 Birth Cohort)
Notes: Values shown over the period 1994–2010. Values are in US 2010 dollars.
Source: Data from LCFS in the United Kingdom and CEX for the United States
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Table 3—Yearly OOP Medical Expenditures by Country:  
2000–2006 Age 60+ 
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 P90 P95
Panel A. United Kingdom 
Total 762 0 46 375 1,729 3,788
 Excluding insurance 574 0 13 255 989 2,243
Private insurance 188 0 0 0 88 881
Prescription drugs 118 0 0 129 342 553
Health services 234 0 0 0 0 1,118
Hospital 41 0 0 0 0 0
Medical equipment 180 0 0 0 0 145
Panel B. United States
Total 5,201 443 2,458 6,125 11,929 17,313
 Excluding insurance 3,361 225 1,122 3,025 6,568 11,152
Private insurance 1,772 32 509 1,592 3,711 5,889
Prescription drugs 1,841 0 150 2,429 5,701 8,236
Health services 964 6 189 718 1,838 2,952
Hospital 301 0 0 0 365 1,062
Notes: Values are annual averages for households where at least one member is aged 60 or 
over. Values are in US 2010 dollars. Figures exclude spending on nursing homes.
Source: Data from the Health and Retirement Survey in the United States and LCFS in the 
United Kingdom
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HRS only includes medical equipment spending in later years, and so these are not 
included in the US data. Consistent with the graphs for the 1928–1932 cohort in 
Figure 9 above, the table shows that average costs are almost 7 times larger in the 
United States than they are in the United Kingdom, with a mean of over $5,201 per 
year compared to just $762 in the United Kingdom. Even though insurance makes 
up proportionately more of the US expenses, the country differences are of the 
same order of  magnitude if we exclude insurance payments. But the US data also 
exhibit considerably greater variance. To illustrate, health expenses at the nine-
ty-fifth percentile are around $17,313 per year (compared to $3,788 in the United 
Kingdom), indicating a much larger risk of very large medical costs in the United 
States.12
One final “institutional” difference between the two countries may be in the 
nature or extent of family ties and caring by family members, and this may have 
effects on medical expenses. A full investigation of the links between family care 
and other medical expenses is an important topic for future research, but it is beyond 
the scope of this paper. We briefly investigated the link between health, family care, 
and OOP medical expenses in the HRS data. For individuals reporting 3 or more 
limitations in Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs), 97  percent reported 
receiving some assistance from family, but this had no relationship with OOP 
expenses. In the United Kingdom, we cannot make a similar calculation since there 
is no dataset with OOP expenses and health, disability, or the receipt of family care; 
 however, since OOP expenses are so low for so many individuals, as discussed 
above, such a relationship between family caring and OOP medical expenses is 
unlikely to be important.
D. Long-Term Care Costs
One important source of medical cost uncertainty is in the cost of long-term care. 
This tends to be most important at older ages (for instance, rising over three-fold 
in the United States for those aged over 85 compared to those aged 75–84 (Fahle, 
McGarry, and Skinner 2016). However, in so far as these expenses also generate 
precautionary motives, they may also affect spending behavior of households within 
our sample (Ameriks et al. 2015).
In the United Kingdom, long-term care costs are not typically covered by the 
NHS, though care costs are often paid for, wholly or partially subject to a means 
test of resources by local authorities. Estimates on the relative importance of private 
versus public spending on long-term care indicates that the majority of costs in the 
United Kingdom are paid for by the public sector. Private spending on formal care is 
roughly half the value of spending by local authorities (National Audit Office 2014) 
and only around a quarter of over 65-year-olds receiving formal care report paying 
for it themselves (Crawford and Stoye 2017).
12 Since the HRS data are a panel, we can also look at longer term spending totals, and indeed the persistence 
of expenses over time. As well as being highly concentrated, medical expenses are also shown to be strongly 
 persistent over the 6-year period, with the correlation between total medical expenditures in 2002 and total medical 
 expenditures 2 and 4 years later being 0.66 and 0.6, respectively. (Full results available from authors on request). 
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In the United States, Medicare does not directly cover the costs of long-term 
nursing care, though it can cover related costs such as care in skilled nursing 
facilities and home health care. Long-term care costs are often covered under the 
Medicaid program, subject to a means test of resources. In 2004, the proportion of 
total long-term care costs paid for under these 2 programs was nearly 60 percent 
(CBO 2004).
Despite differences in the institutions for funding long-term care costs, both 
the overall level and proportion of long-term care financed through private spend-
ing is similar in the two countries (OECD 2005). Census data show that the pro-
portion of population aged 65 and over who are residents in institutions is also 
very similar in the 2 countries at around 3.6  percent in the United Kingdom 
and 4.1  percent in the United States (Peeters, Debels, and Verpoorten 2013, 
Figure 1).
Nursing home costs are not well covered in our household expenditure surveys 
so to make what comparisons we can, we draw on the English Longitudinal Study 
of Ageing (ELSA), which only includes nursing home care costs in its most recent 
wave (covering spending in the period 2014 –2016). We then compare this to the 
latest wave of the HRS to which we have access (covering the period 2012–2014). 
Even in these two surveys, which focus specifically on the older population, the 
 measurement of costs, and even the coverage of the survey, is not comparable for 
those who are residents in institutions, with the main difference being that the 
ELSA data does not currently include any measures of spending for those cur-
rently  residing in institutions. In this respect, HRS data has 3.7 percent of house-
holds over aged 60 with at least one member resident in an institution and a mean 
spending over the last 2 years of $847 in 2010 prices. This is lower than all but 
1 component of OOP medical expenses identified in panel B of Table  3 for the 
United States. But the distribution is highly skewed for those who do incur costs 
(median OOP spending over the previous 2 years amongst those in institutions was 
$930, the seventy-fifth percentile was $31,157, and the ninety-fifth percentile was 
$104,950).
The aging surveys do, however, have comparable measures for OOP  nursing 
home spending over the last two years for those currently residing in the house-
hold sector. Once again, mean spending is low, although a minority of  households 
pay high costs. These patterns are similar in the two countries. 98.3   percent of 
the US household population over aged 60 either did not use  nursing home or 
 institutional care in the previous two years or else paid nothing for their usage. The 
corresponding number in England is 99.4 percent. Mean annual  spending was $53 
in the United States and $30 in England and, conditional on having to pay some-
thing, the top of the distribution in each country was rather similar. Further details 
of the distribution of these transitory nursing home costs is in Table A1 of online 
Appendix A.
Taking all this evidence together, it is clear that nursing home costs are 
small on average, but a significant expense but for a small minority of house-
holds as would be expected. But the risks of high nursing home expenses and 
the size of the  OOP costs if they are incurred are both somewhat similar in the 
two countries.
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V. Inter-temporal Allocations of Consumption
In the previous sections, we noted possible links between trends in demographic 
variables and consumption at older ages. We highlighted differences in  particular 
in the decline in employment, and the pattern of home ownership between the 
two countries. We also noted strikingly different patterns of medical expenditures, 
 summarized in Figure 8, largely reflecting differences in the delivery of health 
 services in the United States and the United Kingdom.
To motivate our regression analysis of consumption growth, we consider the 
case where inter-temporal preferences for nonmedical consumption had the CRRA 
form, and where health and medical consumption is non-separable with nonmedical 
consumption. We then write the following (approximate) conditional Euler equation 
governing inter-temporal spending allocations:13
(1)  Δ ln c i, t = α ln  r t + Δ  X it β + ζΔ  H i, t + ηΔ ln  p h, t +  u i, t ,
where Δ is the first difference operator (i.e.,  Δ  x t =  x t −  x t−1 );   r t is the real 
 interest rate;  c i, t is nonmedical consumption;  h i, t is medical consumption; 
 Δ  X i t is the change in a variety of demographic and household characteristics 
which we detail below;  Δ  H i, t is a measure of the change in health status by house-
hold  members. The change in the real price of medical consumption  Δ ln  p h, t , 
captures the  non-separability with medical consumption.14 For example, this price 
term allows for substitution away from medical consumption as the relative price 
of medical consumption increases.
In the application, we additionally allow for uncertainty in medical expenses 
that might induce precautionary saving. To do this, we follow Banks, Blundell, and 
Brugiavini (2001), and incorporate an additional conditional variance term in the 
consumption growth equation (1) to reflect uncertainty over shocks to future medi-
cal expenses.15 This is explained in more detail in section B below.
A. Growth Rates in Consumer Expenditures
We now turn to our analysis of inter-temporal consumption changes controlling 
for differences in health, labor supply, mortality, and tenure, again tracking group 
level averages over time. In this section, we split households into groups defined 
by education (whether or not the household head or their spouse completed high 
school), as well as year and five-year birth cohorts.
Table 4 shows results from taking an average over the rates of decline in spending 
for nondurable goods, and nondurable goods not including OOP medical  spending 
13 See, for example, Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994). 
14 We could have conditioned directly on the change in medical consumption  h i, t and used changes in medical 
prices as instruments. We decided instead to include the price term to directly capture the effect of medical price 
inflation. 
15 As the preceding discussion shows, non-separabilities may be present within period (affecting relative 
demands for particular goods, but not the level of spending) or across time (affecting the inter-temporal  allocation 
of consumption). In the online Appendix, we examine the shares of expenditure on different goods and look for 
 within-period non-separabilities. 
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for our different cohort-education groups. Nondurable expenditures decline by 
2.21 percent a year on average for cohort-education groups in the United Kingdom 
compared to 1.37 percent in the United States, giving a statistically significant differ-
ence of 0.84 percent between the countries ( p-value 0.034). This difference in con-
sumption expenditures before equivalization between the two countries falls by just 
under three-quarters when OOP medical spending is taken out. This suggests that 
differing health care financing institutions may explain a significant part of the 
 difference between the countries.16
One reason consumption declines at middle and older ages is that people leave the 
household for several reasons, which include the exit of adult children into homes 
of their own, divorce and the death of a spouse. This pattern is illustrated for both 
countries in Figure 10, which plots by age and cohort the fraction of households who 
contain three or more adults. These fractions decline significantly with age in both 
countries, especially between ages 45 and 60, continuing at a somewhat slower pace 
after age 60. 
Declines in the number of adults in the household will of course play a role 
in producing consumption declines at older ages. When we use equivalized con-
sumption expenditures instead in panel B of Table 4, not surprisingly we see that 
rates of decline in both measures of consumption are significantly reduced in both 
countries. This indicates that reductions in the number of people in the household, 
primarily the exit of children and death of spouses, play an important role in the 
rates of decline in both measures of consumption among those ages 45 and above. 
However, the difference between the 2 countries in declines in total nondurable con-
sumption remains large (at 0.59 percent). Once again, this difference between the 
16 Both surveys have seen declines in expenditure relative to aggregate measures of household spending as 
reported in the countries’ respective National Accounts. This steady decline in coverage may have implications for 
cross-country differences estimated here. For the definition of spending we are considering, however, changes in 
coverage over time do not appear important for our results. We discuss this further in online Appendix D. 
Table 4—Average Percent Consumption Growth Rates
United Kingdom United States Country difference 
Panel A. Expenditure
Nondurable −2.21 −1.37 −0.84
Nondurable less medical −2.28 −2.05 −0.23
Panel B. Equivalized expenditure
Nondurable −0.65 −0.05 −0.59
Nondurable less medical −0.72 −0.72 0.00
Notes: Observations weighted by cell size. Equivalized using the OECD scale. The OECD 
scale is 1 for first adult, 0.5 for each additional adult and child 14 and over, and 0.3 for each 
child under 14.
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countries disappears when we examine nondurable consumption less OOP medical 
expenses.17, 18
In addition to the role of OOP medical expenses, however, the results in the 
 previous section also highlight the potential importance of other key determi-
nants—for instance, relating to housing and employment. To see the extent to which 
 controlling for changes in these and other demographic trends can explain the steeper 
decline in nondurable nonmedical consumption that we see in the United Kingdom, 
we  estimate an extended consumption growth equation of the form:
(2)  Δln  c s, k, t =  γ 1 US +  γ 2 UK + αln  r s, t + θ ln  m s, k, t + Δ X s, k, t β + η Δln  p h, t +  u s,  k,  t ,
where  c s, k, t denotes nondurable consumption for a cohort-education group k, in 
 country s, and year t (initially including OOP medical expenses which we later 
remove). The variable US denotes a dummy for the United States and UK a dummy 
for the United Kingdom,  ln r s, t is the log real interest rate, ln  m s, k, t is the log mortality 
rate, and  X s, k, t is a set of demographic controls including family size, employment, 
health status, and housing tenure. Following the discussion of non-separabil-
ity between medical and nonmedical consumption, for specifications where we 
exclude  medical expenditures, we include a term for the change in real medical 
 consumption prices,  Δ ln  p h, t .
17 For completeness, we include a full decomposition of spending on different categories for a given cohort in 
online Appendix C. Declines in expenditure for nonmedical spending categories are remarkably similar across the 
two countries. 
18 In addition to considering differences in mean expenditure, we also examine growth across the twenty-fifth, 
fiftieth, seventy-fifth, ninetieth and ninety-fifth percentiles of the spending distribution. While the decline in spend-
ing growth in both countries is faster toward the bottom of the distribution, there is no clear evidence that cross-coun-
try difference in expenditure declines varies much across the spending distribution. This suggests that the UK–US 
differences are not driven by a few high spending individuals at the top of the distribution in the United States. 
Figure 10. Proportion of Households with Three or More Adults
Note: Each line represents proportions of households with three or more adults (individuals over 16) for five-year 
birth cohorts over the periods they are observed between ages 45 and 79.
Source: Data from LCFS in the United Kingdom and CEX for the United States
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The difference between coefficients  γ 1 and  γ 2 in (2) indicates how much faster 
expenditures decline in the United States relative to the United Kingdom once other 
factors are controlled; note there is no constant term. We think of this difference as 
the unexplained  component of the cross-country difference, and report it separately 
in the regression results that follow (multiplied by 100 to give value in percentage 
point terms).19
Results for different versions of model (2) are shown in Table 5. Column 1 shows 
results using weighted least squares (using cohort cell sizes as weights) with no 
controls and including medical spending in the consumption measure. These results 
are the same as those shown in Table 4 except that to maintain comparability across 
regression models, we use the same sample as we will use in subsequent regressions. 
The difference in the average rates of decline across the two countries is around 
0.9 percentage points and significant at the 5 percent level.
Column 2 of Table 5 adds additional controls for employment, renter status, mor-
tality, and health, as well as the interest rate. These additional controls, capturing 
possible non-separabilities and macroeconomic differences between the two coun-
tries, do not appear to explain the different rates of consumption growth between 
the two countries. Declines in rates of employment and increases in the proportion 
of  renters within each group are both associated with lower spending growth. The 
faster employment declines in the United Kingdom shown in Figure 4 therefore 
help account for some of the differences between the countries. However, the effect 
of this on the unexplained element of the cross-country difference is offset by the 
larger increase in the proportion of renters in the United States, which other things 
equal imply faster spending declines there than the United Kingdom. Overall, the 
unexplained component of the spending difference with these controls is around 
0.7 percentage points.
Column 3 of Table 5 takes the specification used in column 2 but removes 
 medical  expenditures from the consumption variable and allows for the possi-
bility of  non-separability between medical and nonmedical expenses by includ-
ing the change in log relative medical prices in the regression (as implied in 
 equation (1)). Relative medical prices are computed relative to nonmedical non-
durable  consumption spending using a Stone price index as described in online 
Appendix B. The  relative price term enters significantly and indicates a negative 
gross substitution effect of medical consumption. Other things that equal a 1 per-
cent increase in real medical prices from one period to the next are expected to 
reduce  consumption growth by 0.4  percentage points. Even after allowing demo-
graphics and real  medical prices, there is still an unexplained gap in spending 
growth between the two countries of similar magnitude to what we had before 
medical expenditures were omitted.
We might expect some of the characteristics on the right-hand side of the 
 consumption growth specifications in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 to be endoge-
nous. Households that move out of employment or change their tenure status may 
19 We also run specifications including country-age interaction terms. These were not significant for either 
country, suggesting that the difference in the rates of decline in spending between the two countries does not change 
with age. 
VOL. 11 NO. 3 49BANKS ET AL.: LIFE-CYCLE CONSUMPTION PATTERNS AT OLDER AGES
adjust their spending because these developments are responses to unexpected 
shocks that also lead households to reassess the value of their lifetime resources. 
For instance, estimating the average change in consumption when households 
change their employer statement may exaggerate the causal impact of employ-
ment on spending changes if households did not already anticipate the change 
in job status. To account for this, we run weighted instrumental variable regres-
sions in which we instrument changes in employment, housing tenure, health, and 
mortality with their first and second lags. Under standard rational expectations 
assumptions, these should be correlated with current realizations of these variables 
uncorrelated with unanticipated shocks that enter  u s, k, t (we calculate lagged means 
excluding  observations from those  interviewed in the following period for CEX). 
Table 5—Changes in log Nondurable Expenditure
Including medical expenditure Excluding medical expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
United States −0.013 −0.001 −0.004 −0.025
(0.003) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
United Kingdom −0.022 −0.008 −0.011 −0.026
(0.003) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Interest rate 0.040 0.163 0.206
(0.093) (0.096) (0.097)
log mortality 0.001 −0.000 −0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Δ Head employed 0.082 0.095 0.093
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Δ Renter −0.419 −0.400 −0.404
(0.052) (0.053) (0.052)
Δ Number of kids −0.009 −0.009 −0.003
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Δ Number of adults 0.228 0.222 0.220
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Δ Single −0.249 −0.226 −0.228
(0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
Δ Worst health −0.216 −0.239 −0.236
(0.075) (0.076) (0.075)
Δ log medical price −0.394 −0.388
(0.073) (0.072)
 π s, k, t−1 2  ϕ s, k, t 0.002(0.001)
 (US − UK) × 100 0.877 0.691 0.747 0.106
(0.415) (0.390) (0.415) (0.543)
Observations 616  616 616 616
Notes: Estimates presented are for weighted regressions with weights given by cell sizes 
in each education-year-cohort cell. The dependent variable is log nondurable consumption 
( columns 1 and 2 with medical expenditure, columns 3 and 4 without). We also include a con-
trol variable to capture the switch from GHS to HSE surveys in the United Kingdom, as well 
as controls for the change in the proportion of the households responding to subjective health 
questions and the change in the proportion of households where heads report their own health 
(as opposed to responses being given by a proxy) in the United States. In  column 4, we instru-
ment the conditional risk term  π s, k, t−1 2  ϕ s, k, t with its lag value. Comparisons of columns 2 and 
3 with fully instrumented regressions described in the text are available in online Appendix E; 
differences in parameters were not found to be significant.
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However, these IV  models do not produce significantly different results to those 
reported in Table 5, and  Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity of these vari-
ables does not reject the null of exogeneity. The parameters and test statistics are 
reported in online Appendix E. 
B. Precautionary Motives
One omitted factor from our consumption growth analysis so far is uncertainty 
over future OOP medical expenditures. As we showed in Table 3, older  households 
in the United States still face a high risk of large OOP medical expenses in spite 
of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The important role these risks potentially 
play in wealth and consumption dynamics in retirement in the United States have 
been emphasized in Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010). The 
risks of such expenses are much lower in the United Kingdom where households 
effectively enjoy a much greater degree of health insurance coverage. The differ-
ences in the extent of risks of incurring high OOP medical expenses are illustrated 
in Figure 11, where we plot the average differences between the ninetieth and fif-
tieth percentiles of the  distributions of OOP medical expenses in the two coun-
tries within cohort- education cells at  different ages. We plot the ninetieth to fiftieth 
difference since, as we saw in Table 3, the distribution of OOP medical is highly 
positively skewed in both the United States and the United Kingdom, and the main 
risk households in the United States face is the relatively small but nontrivial prob-
ability of very high OOP  medical expenses. Figure 11 shows that in the United 
Kingdom, this measure is roughly a quarter of the size it is in the United States. It 
also tends to increase with age and is larger for more educated households.
What implications might these differences in the dispersion of OOP 
 medical expenses have for consumption profiles? A simple theoreti-
cal analysis, such as that in Banks, Blundell, and Brugiavini (2001), sug-
gests that the effect of uncertainty over shocks to future medical expenses 
on consumption growth will depend on the product of three  factors 
 κ π s, k, t−1 2  ϕ s, k, t , where  κ is a constant scaling factor reflecting both the  persistence 
of shocks and the consumer’s risk aversion,  π s, k, t−1 reflects the  contribution of 
 uncertainty in medical expenses to uncertainty in overall wealth for group k in 
 country s and period t − 1, and  ϕ s, k, t is some measure of the dispersion in OOP 
 medical expenses conditional on information available to each individual consumer 
in period t − 1.
Of the three factors,  π s, k, t−1 2 can be approximated by the squared ratio of OOP 
medical expenses to nondurable consumption excluding medical expenses in 
period t − 1. This can be readily estimated from our cross-sectional data (which we 
do using cohort level averages by education group).20 The patterns across cohorts 
and  countries is very similar to the patterns shown in Figure 8. The choice for the 
measure of dispersion  ϕ s, k, t is less straightforward. We take  ϕ s, k, t to be the period t 
fiftieth–ninetieth range in OOP medical expenses in each cohort education group as 
20 Specifically, the approximation to  π s, k, t−1 is calculated as the square of the cohort-level ratio of medical 
expenditures to nonmedical nondurable spending in each cohort-age-education cell. 
VOL. 11 NO. 3 51BANKS ET AL.: LIFE-CYCLE CONSUMPTION PATTERNS AT OLDER AGES
plotted in Figure 11. We then add  π s, k, t−1 2  ϕ s, k, t into the regression model in (2) and 
instrument with its lag since the term depends on t − 1 spending and is therefore 
endogenous. The coefficient on this term will then reflect the value of  κ .21 This 
approach identifies the scale of precautionary effects using cohort  variation in the 
importance of medical spending uncertainty. The effects of including this term in 
our regression model are reported in the final column 4 of Table 5.22
The uncertainty term enters with the expected positive coefficient and is 
significant at the 10  percent level. The unexplained difference between the 2 
 countries falls from 0.75 to 0.11 percentage points: a remaining difference that is 
not statistically significant. Thus, controlling for medical uncertainty eliminates the 
remaining gap in spending growth between the two countries.
Our results also allow us to estimate the scale of precautionary motives to save 
against OOP medical expense risk in both countries. To calculate this, we take 
21 Ideally,  ϕ s, k, t should not include any predictable changes in medical expenses, as these do not generate 
 precautionary motives. Calculating risk within cells defined by age, cohort, and education eliminates important 
sources of this heterogeneity. Other sources of heterogeneity that lead to multiplicative differences between the 
 conditional and unconditional risk (that might arise if lagged medical expenditures affect current spending through 
an autoregressive process, for example) will be absorbed in the coefficient on  π s, k, t−1 2  ϕ s, k, t .
22 To understand whether other sources of risk may create precautionary motives in the United States, we have 
also run a specification (otherwise the same as that in column 4) where we include a term for income risk that 
is analogous to the term we use for medical expense risk. This enters the regression insignificantly and does not 
greatly affect the magnitude or sign of the medical expense risk term. 
Figure 11. Dispersion in OOP Medical Expenses
Notes: Each line represents averages in the ninetieth–fiftieth   percentiles of the distribution of medical expenses 
within five-year birth cohorts. Lines are smoothed using locally weighted regressions.
Source: Data from LCFS in the United Kingdom and CEX for the United States
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the predicted spending profiles using our regression results and compare them 
with those predicted for a counterfactual world in which there was no  medical 
 uncertainty (using results corresponding to the model in column 4 of Table  5 
and households from the cohort born in the years 1933–1937). With medical 
 uncertainty, the expected average annual decline in spending (excluding medi-
cal) is 2.21 percent per year in the United States and 1.80 percent in the United 
Kingdom. Without  medical uncertainty, the predicted declines are 3.10  percent 
in the United States and 1.81 percent in the United Kingdom. We therefore esti-
mate that precautionary motives raise consumption growth in the United States by 
around 0.90  percentage points per year on average for the ages we consider.
VI. Conclusions
For many years, debates surrounding the question of whether individuals’ have 
saved enough to fund their consumption needs have focused on whether  documented 
declines in consumption spending over the retirement period could be fully accounted 
for by optimal behavior within the framework of the  life-cycle model. For instance, 
early work on the “retirement savings puzzle” attributed declines in spending 
between pre- and post-retirement periods to a failure of consumption smoothing that 
indicated a lack of preparedness for retirement (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg 
2001). More recent work has argued that those declines that are observed can be 
fully accounted for through a combination of home production and non-separable 
preferences (Hurst 2008).
The work we have reported in this paper has emphasized how the interpreta-
tion of such profiles must be understood in terms of the institutional environment 
that individuals face, and in particular, the extent to which individuals are exposed 
to uninsured OOP medical cost risks and uncertainties. Relatively large and unin-
sured risks can generate modestly declining spending profiles on average, which do 
not necessarily indicate sufficiency of resources. We have compared consumption 
 trajectories for older households in the United Kingdom and the United States. In 
the United States, spending tends to remain relatively flat at older ages, while it 
declines quite steeply in the United Kingdom. These differences persist when we 
control for other variables including employment, health, and so on, that evolve 
differently in the two countries.
A key component in explaining this difference is OOP medical spending, which 
rises in the United States much faster than in the United Kingdom where medical 
expenses tend to be covered by the state. Taking out OOP medical spending from 
our  comparison reduces the gap in the average decline in consumption spending by 
roughly three-quarters. Although other differences such as inheritance taxes, house 
price movements, long-term care costs and risks, and income risk may also play a 
role in explaining these differences, we find suggestive evidence that precautionary 
motives to save in the face of greater OOP medical risk in the United States are 
 sufficient to eliminate the remaining gap.
These findings have relevance for discussions of consumption behavior 
at older ages. It is often found that older households, particularly in the United 
States, tend to continue to amass wealth as they age (see Love, Palumbo, and 
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Smith 2009). In this paper, we point out and account for differences between 
US households and households in an  environment where the risks of high medi-
cal expenses have been effectively  eliminated and for whom spending declines by 
much more.
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